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ABSTRACT In this paper, a game theory-based partitioning algorithm for large-scale systems (LSS) is
proposed. More specifically, a game over nodes is introduced in a model predictive control framework.
The Shapley value of this game is used to rank the communication links of the control network based on
their impact on the overall system performance. A randomized method to estimate the Shapley value of
each node and also an efficient redistribution of the resulting value to the links involved are considered
to relieve the combinatorial explosion issues related to LSS. Once the partitioning solution is obtained,
a sensitivity analysis is proposed to give a measure of its performance. Likewise, a greedy fine tuning
procedure is considered to increase the optimality of the partitioning results. The full Barcelona drinking
water network (DWN) is analyzed as a real LSS case study showing the effectiveness of the proposed
approach in comparison with other partitioning schemes available in the literature.
INDEX TERMS Coalitional control, cooperative game theory, system partitioning, randomized methods,
Shapley value, large-scale systems (LSS), drinking water networks (DWN).
I. INTRODUCTION
MODEL predictive control (MPC) has evolved consid-erably over the last decades. It designates an ample
range of control methods that make explicit use of a model
of the process to obtain the control signal by minimizing an
objective function [1]. Its flexibility – for any type of model
can be used – and the ease of dealing with constraints and
dead times are well-known advantages of this methodology.
In particular, this paper focuses on distributed MPC (DMPC)
schemes, where the overall control problem is divided into
smaller pieces assigned to local controllers or agents, which
are able to communicate among them. Typical features of
these approaches, such as scalability, modularity, and the
capacity of controlling large-scale systems (LSS) [2], will be
very welcome in this work.
Each agent involved in a distributed scheme has partial
system information and communicates with neighbors for the
sake of coordination [3]. Typically, the partition of the overall
system is assumed to be given before the DMPC strategy
is applied, and it is calculated during the system modeling,
based on physical insight, experience or intuition, and other
methods available in the literature, where the starting point
is commonly associated with the seminal work of Siljak [4].
Recently, many partitioning schemes have appeared, based
on graph theory [5]–[8], states/inputs estimation [9], social
network algorithms [10], genetic algorithms [11], or PageR-
ank [12]. In any case, no single partitioning strategy is the
best fit for all situations. This way, specific partitioning tech-
niques have been applied to real LSS case studies, e.g., in wa-
ter systems [10], [13]–[15], power networks [16], [17], bio-
logical systems [18], integrated circuits [19], and urban traffic
networks [20]. In fact, LSS might involve a big communica-
tion network implying the handling of large amount of data,
which could yield in high computational costs. Therefore,
performing the partition of the problem into smaller pieces
is a natural solution for managing these networks.
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In this work, the coalitional control framework, which can
be summarized as a set of dynamic partitioning methods for
networked control systems that seek for a trade-off between
communication burden and control performance [21]–[26],
is used to determine static neighborhoods that define the
partitioning of an LSS. That is, despite its dynamic scope,
the coalitional framework can be used to obtain offline system
information, i.e., independent from the implementation of the
control scheme. In this coalitional context, the well-known
Shapley value, a cooperative game solution concept pre-
sented originally in [27], is used here to provide information
regarding the relevance of the agents and the links involved
in a communication network, following the ideas described
in [21]–[23]. The specific contributions of this article with
respect these earlier works are the following:
a) A game defined in the set of agents is proposed here,
where the closed-loop stage cost of the system is ac-
cumulated along the simulation scenario. This is a dif-
ference with respect to previous works, were open-loop
costs where used at each time step. This game is associ-
ated with the cost function of a coalitional MPC scheme,
in the line of [23]. Note that the viewpoint is changed
with respect to [21], [22], where a game with the players
being the links was related to the cost function of a
coalitional approach based on linear feedback gains.
b) The Shapley value, which gives an averaged contribu-
tion of each player into the game, is calculated here
by using randomized methods [28], [29] satisfying a
minimum bounded error requirement. The relevance of
the links is obtained by an index, introduced in [23],
which redistributes the Shapley value from the agents
to the links.
c) In [21], [23], a very preliminar partitioning that uses
few thresholds to classify the links as a function of the
control performance is proposed. Here, the partitioning
algorithm is drastically improved by introducing new
parameters that balance the size of the communication
components. Additionally, a new set that refers to ex-
pensive links among components is also introduced here
to provide a proper definition of the network configura-
tion after applying the partitioning method.
d) A sensitivity analysis that gives a measure of the par-
titioning control performance is included in this pa-
per. Through this analysis, the proposed partitioning
solution is compared with other schemes available in the
literature [10], [13], and also with the centralized and
decentralized configurations. Moreover, this analysis is
recursively implemented in a greedy fashion [30], [31]
to make a fine tuning of the partitioning approach.
Notice that the results reported in previous works were
only suitable for academic small networks. Nevertheless,
through the combination of a) and b) the computational and
combinatorial explosion issues related to LSS are mitigated
and it is possible to implement the new partitioning algorithm
introduced in c) and d) in such networks. Moreover, the full
Barcelona drinking water network (DWN), modeled in [13],
[14], is chosen as a real LSS case study to assess the effective-
ness of the proposed partitioning approach, which represents
an additional contribution of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the problem setting is stated in a coalitional
control framework. Next, in Section III, a game over nodes
is considered, being the Shapley value utilized as a means of
distributing the cost of the game among the agents. Likewise,
a randomized method to estimate the Shapley value and a
redistribution of this value to the set of links are proposed
to deal with combinatorial explosion issues. In Section IV,
a Shapley value-based partitioning algorithm is introduced.
The partitioning performance is evaluated by means of a
sensitivity analysis, whose information is also recursively
used for a fine tuning of the proposed approach. In Section V,
the Barcelona DWN is presented as the case study, with
the corresponding partitioning results and comparisons with
other approaches being presented in Section VI. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF COALITIONAL CONTROL
Consider the class of distributed linear systems composed of
N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} interconnected subsystems or agents.
The dynamics of agent i ∈ N can be mathematically
described, with k ∈ Z+, as
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biiui(k) +wi(k),
wi(k) =
∑
j 6=i
[Aijxj(k) +Bijuj(k)] +Bpidi(k),
(1)
where xi(k) ∈ Rnxi is the state vector of agent i, ui(k) ∈
Rnui its corresponding input vector, and wi(k) ∈ Rnxi
the related disturbances, which can be either external to the
whole system, denoted by di(k) ∈ Rndi , or be caused by
the neighbors as well. Likewise, Aii ∈ Rnxi×nxi ,Bii ∈
Rnxi×nui , Aij ∈ Rnxi×nxj ,Bij ∈ Rnxi×nuj and Bpi ∈
Rnxi×ndi are system matrices of suitable dimensions. Both
states and inputs are constrained into independent sets de-
fined by a collection of linear inequalities, i.e.,
xi(k) ∈ Xi, Xi ⊆ Rnxi , ui(k) ∈ Ui, Ui ⊆ Rnui . (2)
A. NETWORKED COALITIONAL STRUCTURE
In standard coalitional control, the agents are merged at each
time instant into several disjoint neighborhoods or commu-
nication components C1, C2, . . . , Cnc , verifying
⋃nc
s=1 Cs =
N . Conversely, the goal in this paper is to use coali-
tional control to find a time-independent set denoted as
NC = {C1, C2, . . . , Cnc}, i.e., nc = |NC |, assuming that
agents inN are initially connected by a network described by
an undirected graph (N , E), where E = EN = N ×N is the
set of links corresponding to all feasible communication con-
nections among the agents. Hence, the number of elements in
both sets is, in the worst case, connected by [21], [23]
|E| = |N |(|N | − 1)
2
, (3)
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which corresponds to the number of links of a complete
network. This case, which is the most demanding in terms
of problem size, will be assumed throughout the paper. Note
that, under this premise, any group or coalition C ⊆ N of
agents is internally connected.
Each link l ∈ E can be classified according to its relevance
from a control viewpoint. This way, it can be more profitable
for the overall system performance to fix/disconnect some
links permanently. In this work, the partitioning objective
will focus on finding out those links. When a specific coali-
tion C is formed, a model analogous to (1) is calculated at a
coalition level, i.e.,
xC(k + 1) = ACCxC(k) +BCCuC(k) +wC(k),
wC(k) =
∑
j /∈C
[ACjxj(k) +BCjuj(k)] +BpCdC(k),
(4)
with xC(k) = [xi(k)]i∈C ∈ RnxC , uC(k) = [ui(k)]i∈C ∈
RnuC and wC(k) = [wi(k)]i∈C ∈ RnwC , dC(k) =
[di(k)]i∈C ∈ RndC being respectively the coalitional states,
inputs, overall disturbances and external disturbances that
aggregate the corresponding vectors, and ACC ∈ RnxC×nxC ,
BCC ∈ RnxC×nuC , ACj ∈ RnxC×nxj , BCj ∈ RnxC×nuj
and BpC ∈ RnxC×ndC are obtained by aggregating the cor-
responding individual matrices. The coalitional constraints
become
xC(k) ∈ XC ⊆ RnxC , XC =
∏
i∈C Xi,
uC(k) ∈ UC ⊆ RnuC , UC =
∏
i∈C Ui.
(5)
Finally, from an overall centralized viewpoint, the system is
described by
xN (k+ 1) = ANxN (k) +BNuN (k) +BpNdN (k), (6)
with xN (k) ∈ RnxN , uN (k) ∈ RnuN , dN (k) ∈ RndN
being, respectively, the overall state, input and disturbance
vectors. Note that from a centralized viewpoint, wN (k) is
only composed of external disturbances BpNdN (k). The
centralized constraints have the form
xN (k) ∈ XN ⊆ RnxN , XN =
∏
i∈N Xi,
uN (k) ∈ UN ⊆ RnuN , UN =
∏
i∈N Ui.
(7)
B. CONTROL OBJECTIVE
Under an MPC framework, the goal of each coalitional
controller C ⊆ N is to drive a sequence of future states over
a prediction horizon Np, that is, XC(k + 1 : k + Np) =
{xC(k + 1), . . . ,xC(k + Np)}, by using the most appropri-
ate control sequence. To this end, the controller solves the
following open-loop finite-horizon optimization problem at
each time instant k:
U∗C(k : k +Np − 1) =
arg min
UC(k:k+Np−1)
Np−1∑
r=0
`C
(
xC(k + r + 1),uC(k + r)
)
,
(8)
subject to (4), (5), the aggregate forecast of the expected local
disturbances WˆC(k : k + Np − 1) = {wˆC(k), . . . , wˆC(k +
Np − 1)}, and a measured coalitional initial state xˆc(k).
Likewise, `C
(
xC(k),uC(k)
)
is a certain convex coalitional
stage cost that is minimized along the prediction horizon. As
a result, the sequence of the coalitional optimal control inputs
over Np, that is, U∗C(k : k+Np− 1) = {u∗C(k), . . . ,u∗C(k+
Np − 1)} is obtained. Only the first control input u∗C(k)
is actually applied, and the rest of elements are discarded.
At the next time instant, (8) is solved again in a receding
horizon fashion.
Notice that a coalition can be a singleton. In this case,
each local controller i ∈ N solves an optimization problem
analogous to (8) by taking C = i. Likewise, to compute
a centralized MPC scheme implemented in a distributed
fashion it is enough to calculate the optimal input sequence
by taking C = N and solving (8).
III. COOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
In [21], [22], the set of links E was interpreted as the set of
players of a cooperative game whose characteristic function
assigned a value to each of the different configurations of
links or network topologies. As commented before, in the
approach proposed this paper it is assumed that the number of
links is related to the agents by (3). Hence, to mitigate com-
binatorial explosion issues associated to LSS, the perspective
of the aforementioned works is changed here, as done in [23],
to working directly with a cooperative game (N ,v) defined
over the set of agents N . To this end, a cost function v
that assigns a cost to each coalition of players C ⊆ N is
defined by
v(C,xN ) =
Tsim−1∑
k=0
[
`C
(
xC(k + 1),u∗C(k)
)
+
∑
i/∈C
`i
(
xi(k + 1),u
∗
i (k)
)]
,
(9)
with `i
(
xi(k),ui(k)
)
and `C
(
xC(k),uC(k)
)
being the stage
costs, which will be defined for the case study in Section V-B,
and where Tsim is the number of simulation steps used to
accumulate the closed-loop stage cost of the system over the
simulation time. This function v is computed by applying at
each time step the first element of the control sequence of
coalition C, i.e., u∗C(k), which is obtained by solving (8). The
rest of the agents calculate their input sequences u∗i (k) by
solving (8), with C = i, independently.
Remark 1. Equation (9) is evaluated with input information
from all agents, independently whether they are either in
or out the coalition C. Each coalition C solves its own
optimization problem, which is decoupled from the rest of the
network. Hence, 2|N | values are needed to fully characterize
function v using the standard approach, which is not the case
in this work, as it will be shown in the next subsection by
considering randomized methods.
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Once the game is defined, the Shapley value [27] is con-
sidered here to get the corresponding cost that each player
expects from the game. This value assigns to game (N ,v)
vector φ(N ,v), defined ∀i ∈ N as
φi(N ,v) =∑
C⊆N ,i/∈C
|C|!(|N | − |C| − 1)!
|N |! [v(C ∪ {i},xN )− v(C,xN )],
(10)
i.e., the marginal contribution of each agent i ∈ N is
averaged for all possible coalition permutations it can be
part of.
Remark 2. Equation (10) was originally defined in the
context of transferable utility (TU) games. Given that agents
out of C work independently, an univocal v(C) is obtained
for each C, and (9) could be interpreted as a TU-game by
simply assuming a redefined game v′(C,xN ) = v(C,xN ) −
v(∅,xN ). This way, the Shapley value of this redefined game,
which trivially coincides with the Shapley value of the origi-
nal game (see [22]), will be considered here.
Given that the partitioning procedure proposed in this
paper will be performed by fixing/disconnecting some com-
munication links among the different agents, a measure of the
relevance of the links is required. Given a link l = {i, j} ∈ E ,
it is possible to redistribute the Shapley value of the agents
that are the end-points of this link, i.e., i and j, by means of
the following expression [23]:
ξl(N ,v) = 1|Ei|φi(N ,v) +
1
|Ej |φj(N ,v), (11)
with Ei and Ej being, respectively, the set of links connected
to agents i and j. Notice that values ξl(N ,v) satisfy effi-
ciency as the original Shapley value, i.e.,∑
l∈E
ξl(N ,v) =
∑
i∈N
φi(N ,v) = v(N ,xN ). (12)
Note that (11) provides a way to arrange and compare the
links according to their relevance from a control-performance
perspective, which can be interpreted as a LinkRank, in the
line of [32]. This way, the lower this value is, the more useful
the link becomes. This is consistent with the Shapley value,
which associates useful players to lower values.
Remark 3. Equation (11) provides information from all links
l ∈ E by means of the Shapley value of agent-based game (9),
which is obtained by evaluating the corresponding 2|N |
coalitions. This fact mitigates the combinatorial explosion
of the method proposed in [21], which depends on a link-
game that requires to evaluate 2|E| coalitions per game, with
|E| = f(|N |2) as shown in (3).
A. ESTIMATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
In networks with a large number of agents it is not computa-
tionally feasible to compute (9) for every coalition. This issue
can be solved by using randomized methods such as [28],
[29]. In particular, the method in [28] is used here to provide
an estimation of the Shapley value of each agent calculated
in polynomial time provided that (9) can also be calculated
in polynomial time, which will be shown in Section V-B. To
this end, the following alternative definition of the Shapley
value, expressed in terms of all possible orderings of players
inN coming into coalition, i.e., |N |!, is used in the sampling
method given in [28]:
φi(N ,v) = 1|N |!
∑
pi∈Π(N )
mpii (N ,v), ∀i ∈ N , (13)
where the orderings are assumed to be equiprobable, with
Π(N ) being the collection of all permutations pi, and where
mpii (N ,v) = v ({j ∈ N : pi(j) ≤ pi(i)})
− v({j ∈ N : pi(j) < pi(i)}),
(14)
is the marginal contribution of player i to the players that are
ranked before it in permutation pi.
The basics of the method in [28] consist in choosing
a given number of random orderings from set Π(N ) for
estimating the Shapley value of each player. To this end, a
set Q that contains a sample of q different permutations pi,
which are taken with replacement and with equal probability
from set Π(N ), is considered. This way, an estimation of
the Shapley value is given by the average of the marginal
contributions over set Q, i.e.,
φ˜i(N ,v) = 1
q
∑
pi∈Q
mpii (N ,v), ∀i ∈ N . (15)
Equation (15) provides an approximation of the Shapley
value with desirable properties. In particular, as the Shapley
value, the estimator satisfies efficiency. Moreover, following
the central limit theorem, it holds [28] that the estimator
is a normal distribution with the following mean value and
standard deviation:
φ˜i(N ,v) ∼ N
(
φi,
σ2φi
q
)
, (16)
with
σ2φi =
1
|N |!
∑
pi∈Π(N )
(
mpii (N ,v)− φi(N ,v)
)2
, ∀i ∈ N .
(17)
Consequently, if the number of permutations q is chosen
satisfying the following condition, ∀i ∈ N [28]:
q ≥
Z2λ/2σ
2
φi
ε2
, (18)
the estimation error is is guaranteed to be bounded by [28]
P
(|φ˜i(N ,v)− φi(N ,v)| ≤ ε) ≥ 1− λ, (19)
with ε being the approximation error, Z ∼ N(0, 1), and
where Z2λ/2 is the value such that P (Z ≥ Z2λ/2) = λ/2,
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Finally, note that by taking σφi = αε,
i.e., proportionally to the desired error, condition (18) is
reduced to
q ≥ αZ2λ/2. (20)
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IV. SHAPLEY-VALUE-BASED PARTITIONING
ALGORITHM
The main objective of the algorithm presented in this paper is
to find which agents should cooperate to improve the overall
system performance. Notice that, some preliminar steps are
needed before it can be launched. In the first place, there is a
pre-partitioning stage in which a set of atomic agents needs
to be defined by assigning states, actions and constraints to
minimum size entities that could work in a fully decentralized
fashion, i.e., without the need for communication with other
parts of the system. In this work, as it will be shown in
Section V-A, these agents stem from the constraints imposed
on the system by the node equations.
Once the agents are defined, a communication link be-
tween each pair of agents is considered, with the full number
of links given by (3). Then, it is needed to classify these
links according to their relevance in terms of their impact
on the overall system performance. To this end, a measure
index related to the Shapley value is associated with each
link as follows:
Measure Indices Procedure
Let (N , E) be a network that describes a set N of agents
connected by links l ∈ E . Consider also a measured initial
state xˆN (k) and a forecast of the expected disturbances
WˆN (k : k +Np − 1). Then,
a) Calculate a size q that guarantees, following (18), that
the estimation error is under desired limits.
b) Compute φ˜i(N ,v),∀i ∈ N , by using (15). For each
coalition C ∈ NC , the optimal input sequence over Np
is obtained by solving (8) for C and also for the agents
out of C. Only the first control input is applied, and the
rest of elements are discarded. At the next time step
these optimization problems are solved in a receding
horizon fashion. This process is performed during Tsim
time instants and the cumulated cost of this closed-loop
simulation is used to build v(C,xN ) by means of (9).
c) Redistribute the obtained Shapley value among the links
by indices ξ˜l(N ,v), calculated by using (11).
Therefore, index ξ˜l(N ,v) measures the impact of link l in
the control network. Based on these indices, it is possible to
rank the links, which in turns allows to obtain the following
subsets:
• Set Ec ⊆ E : it includes the links that are inexpensive
enough in control terms to always be fixed. This way,
agents connected by links belonging to Ec cooperate
together and will be merged in a single agent, which
corresponds to any of the communication components
in NC = {C1, C2, . . . , Cnc}.
• Set Ee ⊆ E : it comprises the links that are too costly
for the system in terms of control performance, and
therefore will be permanently disconnected.
Basically, the partitioning algorithm in this section is intro-
duced with the aim of determining sets Ec and Ee. Both sets
are initially assumed to be empty, and links will be gradually
included in those sets if they satisfy certain conditions. This
way, links in Ec(s) define the communication components in
NC(s) in a given iteration s ∈ N+. Some concepts that will
be needed to perform the partitioning are introduced next:
• K: symbolizes the mean span among indices ξ˜l(N ,v)
and it is defined by
K =
ξ˜lmax(N ,v)− ξ˜lmin(N ,v)
|E| , (21)
where lmax and lmin denote, respectively, the links with
maximum and minimum measure indices ξ˜l(N ,v).
• Ci(s): denotes the component in NC(s) where agent i
belongs to.
• Ei(s): denotes the set of remaining links in E\Ec(s)
connected to agent i.
Notice that the sizes of sets Ci(s) and Ei(s) are inversely
related. Both sets will be of interest in the Shapley-value-
based partitioning algorithm, which is presented below.
if ξ˜(s)l∗c (N ,v) + Γ < Lc AND Ci∗(s) 6= Cj∗(s) =⇒

Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s) ∪ l∗c ,
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N ,v) =

ξ˜
(s)
l (N ,v), l /∈ {Ei∗(s+ 1) ∪ Ej∗(s+ 1)},
ξ˜
(s)
l (N ,v) + ρK|Ei∗ (s+1)| , l ∈ Ei∗(s+ 1),
ξ˜
(s)
l (N ,v) + ρK|Ej∗ (s+1)| , l ∈ Ej∗(s+ 1),
else if Ci∗(s) = Cj∗(s) =⇒
{ Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s) ∪ l∗c ,
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N ,v) = ξ˜(s)l (N ,v),
otherwise =⇒
{ Ec(s+ 1) = Ec(s),
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N ,v) = ξ˜(s)l (N ,v),
(23)
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Partitioning Algorithm 1
Let ξ˜l(N ,v) be the indices related to each link l ∈ E . Let
Lc,Le ∈ R be given thresholds, verifyingLc ≤ Le. Finally,
let s be a counter variable.
I) Computation of set Ec
Let γ, ρ ∈ R+\{0}, ν ≥ 1 be scalar parameters. Let also
K be the mean span given by (21). Starting with s = 0, and
assuming ξ˜(0)l (N ,v) = ξ˜l(N ,v) and Ec(0) = ∅, do
1) Obtain the link with minimum measure index from the
remaining links that are not yet included in set Ec(s),
i.e.,
l∗c = arg min
l
ξ˜
(s)
l (N ,v), l ∈ E\Ec(s). (22)
2) Validate link l∗c = {i∗, j∗} as a suitable candidate to
be added to Ec(s), and update this set and the links
neighbors of l∗c consequently, doing, ∀l ∈ E\Ec(s + 1),
the procedure defined by (23), with Γ being calculated
as
Γ = γK (|Ci∗(s)|+ |Cj∗(s)|)ν . (24)
3) Make s = s + 1 and go to Step 1, while ξ˜(s)l∗c (N ,v) <
Lc. Otherwise, the procedure ends and set Ec is fully
determined, i.e., Ec = Ec(s).
II) Computation of set Ee
Starting again with s = 0, and assuming ξ˜(0)l (N ,v) =
ξ˜l(N ,v), Ee(0) = ∅, do
4) Obtain the link with maximum measure index from the
remaining links, i.e.,
l∗e = arg max
l
ξ˜
(s)
l (N ,v), l ∈ E\(Ec ∪ Ee(s)). (25)
5) Validate link l∗e = {i∗, j∗} as a suitable candidate for
set Ee(s), and update this set consequently, doing
Ee(s+ 1) = Ee(s) ∪ l∗e , if ξ˜(s)l∗e (N ,v) > Le,
Ee(s+ 1) = Ee(s), otherwise.
(26)
6) Make s = s + 1 and go to Step 4, while ξ˜(s)l∗e (N ,v) >
Le. Otherwise, the procedure ends and set Ee is fully
determined, i.e., Ee = Ee(s).
Notice that the inclusion of a new link l∗c in Ec(s) depends
on the size of the components at s that this link will connect.
More specifically, Γ penalizes a new link candidate to Ec(s)
before deciding whether it should be included in that set, in
case that this link would connect two different components in
NC(s), and proportionally to their cardinality. Additionally,
in case that l∗c is accepted, the proposed algorithm penalizes
its neighboring links that remain in set E\Ec(s + 1), by a
term that is larger as less neighbors of l∗c remain in that
set, which in turns implies that l∗c is more congested in
Ec(s + 1). These mechanisms induce size constraints on the
FIGURE 1. Two iteration steps in the process of obtaining set Ec
components, which avoid inefficient partitionings that could
lead to an almost centralized scheme. This way, the proposed
parameters γ, ν and ρ could be adjusted to obtain some
properties of interest, e.g., to impose a maximum cardinality
for any communication component.
Example 1. Take the network in Fig. 1, with six agents
connected by 15 links. In a given iteration s (see Fig. 1a),
it is obtained
Ec(s) =
{{1, 2}}, NC(s) = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}},
(27)
Then, consider that link l∗c = {i∗, j∗} = {1, 3} is proposed
to be fixed. The sets related to this link in iteration s are
described by
C1(s) = {1, 2}, E1(s) =
{{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}},
C3(s) = {3}, E3(s) =
{{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {3, 6}}.
(28)
Assume at this point that ξ˜(s)l∗c (N ,v) + Γ < Lc. This
way, given that C1(s) 6= C3(s), the first statement in (23)
is fulfilled, hence link {1, 3} is included in set Ec(s+ 1) (see
Fig. 1b), obtaining
Ec(s+ 1) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}},
NC(s+ 1) =
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}, {6}},
C1(s+ 1) = C3(s+ 1) = {1, 2, 3},
E1(s+ 1) =
{{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}},
E3(s+ 1) =
{{2, 3}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {3, 6}}.
(29)
Therefore, ∀l ∈ E\Ec(s + 1), all measure indices are
updated if l belongs either to E1(s + 1) or E3(s + 1), by
increasing in an inversely proportional way to the cardinality
of those sets
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N ,v) = ξ˜(s)l (N ,v) + ρK3 , l ∈ E1(s+ 1),
ξ˜
(s+1)
l (N ,v) = ξ˜(s)l (N ,v) + ρK4 , l ∈ E3(s+ 1).
(30)
Finally, consider that l∗c = {i∗, j∗} = {2, 3} is also
proposed to be fixed. In that case, given that C2(s + 1) =
C3(s + 1) = {1, 2, 3}, the second statement in (25) is
satisfied, and the link will be included in set Ec(s + 2).
Nevertheless, no updates on the measure indices of links
l ∈ E\Ec(s+ 2) would be considered.
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Once set Ec is fully determined, a new single agent cor-
responding to each component in NC is established, inde-
pendently of whether the agents inside this component are
directly or indirectly connected. Therefore, the system is
reduced to |NC | new agents, which may communicate or not,
depending on the needs of the control scheme. The possible
links among the agents are denoted by EC = NC×NC , which
verifies |EC | = |NC|(|NC|−1)2 , according to (3). That is, links
lC ∈ EC are defined as
lC = {Ca, Cb}, ∀Ca, Cb ∈ NC . (31)
Finally, the information provided by Ee is used to determine
links lC that should be permanently disconnected. Given that
links in Ee are referred to agents instead of components,
it is necessary to obtain a new set, say EeC , referred to
components. In this work, it is considered that two compo-
nents should not have a direct cooperation if all links that
interconnect the agents inside both components belong to
subset Ee, i.e.,
If l = {i, j} ∈ Ee,∀i ∈ Cˇa,∀j ∈ Cˇb −→ lˇC = {Cˇa, Cˇb} ∈ EeC .
(32)
Summing up, the configuration of the system will be
described after performing the partitioning by the following
network:
(NC , EC\EeC ), (33)
where the links in EC\EeC may be dynamically enabled or
disabled at each time instant by means of a coalitional control
approach [22], [24].
Remark 4. The proposed Shapley-value-based algorithm
represents a heuristic methodology for the system partition-
ing that avoids an exhaustive exploration of every coalition
involved in the control scheme. Note that this methodology
is independent from the model dynamics or the game choice,
i.e., nonlinear systems or alternative definitions for the game
different to (9) are possible. For example, it might be consid-
ered theoretical aspects such as stability or robustness [2],
[33], which are out of the scope here since this work only
focus on the partitioning methodology. Likewise, for the sake
of clarity, the class of linear systems described by (1), which
is widely studied in the literature, is assumed here.
Remark 5. The way the agents inside a component are actu-
ally connected once the partitioning is performed is beyond
of the scope of this work. This issue could be dealt with,
e.g., by using spanning tree algorithms [34], [35], in order
to find the minimum set of links that is necessary to connect
all agents belonging to a given component. In any case, note
that the partitioning approach reduces the communication
costs of the original centralized scheme, given that the agents
inside a component after performing the partitioning are only
required to communicate to their neighbors.
FIGURE 2. Establishing the components and their removed links by Ec and Ee
Example 2. Consider again the network presented in Exam-
ple 1, with six agents and 15 links. Assume that after applying
the partitioning algorithm, sets Ec and Ee are given by (see
Fig. 2a):
Ec =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}},
Ee =
{{1, 6}, {3, 6}, {4, 6}, {5, 6}}. (34)
The links in Ec define the following components:
C1 = {1, 2, 3}, C2 = {4, 5}, C3 = {6}, (35)
which are also assumed to be connected by links {C1, C2},
{C1, C3} and {C2, C3}. From these three links, only link
{C2, C3} verifies the criterion given in (32), i.e., all links
that connect agents in components C2 and C3 are included in
set Ee. Hence, this link should be permanently disconnected.
Therefore, the final configuration of the network is shown in
Fig. 2b and it is given by
(NC , EC\EeC ) =
({C1, C2, C3},{{C1, C2}, {C1, C3}}).
(36)
A. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROL
PERFORMANCE: A PARTITIONING ALGORITHM FINE
TUNING
The rationale behind the partitioning procedure is to pro-
vide a reasonable trade-off between control and communi-
cation costs. Therefore, the proposed Shapley-value-based
approach, denoted from now on by SVBA, provides us with a
suboptimal solutionNC for the partitioning of an LSS, where
the optimal solution corresponds with the centralized case
(only one component) when communication costs are not
considered. Once NC is established, the closed-loop system
performance can be related to the cumulated cost Jcum(NC),
which is obtained by computing each component C ∈ NC
by using (9). Then, in order to give an insight of the SVBA
fitness, it would be interesting to compare the cumulated
cost of partition NC with the rest of possible partitioning
approaches. Nevertheless, note that the number of ways to
partition a set of |N | agents into nonempty components is
given by the Bell number [36]
B|N | =
|N |∑
s=0
 1
s!
s∑
j=0
(−1)s−j
(
s
j
)
j|N |
, (37)
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which becomes computationally infeasible for LSS so as
comparing NC with this full set. To solve this issue, here
it is considered the subset composed of all partitions N swiC ,
which differ from NC in the fact that only one agent i ∈ N
switches components. This set will be denoted by ΨN ,NC and
its cardinality is given by
|ΨN ,NC | = |N ||NC | − |N |C|=1C |
(
|N |C|=1C |+ 1
2
)
, (38)
where |N |C|=1C | is the number of singletons in NC . Note
that a new component could be formed assuming the agent
that switches components is not already a singleton in NC .
Likewise, redundant switches between any two singletons are
also discarded from set ΨN ,NC .
Once set ΨN ,NC is introduced, some related indices will be
obtained and compared with those ofNC , which can be inter-
preted as a sensitivity analysis of the SVBA. In particular, the
minimum, maximum, and mean cumulated costs of partitions
N swiC ∈ ΨN ,NC will be of interest. Likewise, a parameter that
computes the portion of partitionsN swiC that are improved by
NC will also be considered and symbolized by ηp, with p
being a certain uncertainty limit, i.e., to be better than NC it
is required to outperform its cost beyond a certain threshold.
Notice also that the partition with minimum cumulated
cost from ΨN ,NC , say N (1)C , provides a suboptimal solu-
tion that improves NC . Consequently, it is possible to op-
timize recursively the SVBA in a greedy fashion by us-
ing the minimum-cost solutions N (r)C from the successive
sets Ψ(r−1)N ,NC , whose elements in turns admit that only one
agent switches components from partition N (r−1)C , with r ∈
N+, r > 1, i.e.,
N (r)C = arg minN swiC
Jcum(N swiC )
s.t. N swiC ∈ Ψ(r−1)N ,NC ,
(39)
until reaching any pre-established stopping criterion, e.g.,
a maximum number of iterations rmax or a minimum per-
formance improvement between iterations. This optimiza-
tion represents a fine tuning of the SVBA, denoted here
by SVBA-FT. Note that, as considered in the SVBA, some
additional constraints should be included by the control de-
signer in the SVBA-FT to balance the size of the components.
Likewise, note that sets Ec, Ee and EeC could be modified as a
consequence of the fine tuning procedure. In any case, these
changes improve the performance of the optimized solution,
symbolized by N optC .
Remark 6. Given how ΨN ,NC is built, the impact on com-
munication burden between two consecutive optimization
steps is negligible. Nevertheless, when a high number of
steps is performed, the aforementioned size constraints and
also a stopping criterion are necessary to avoid inefficient
centralized partitionings.
TABLE 1. Set ΨN ,NC related toNC described by (35)
1 C1 = {2, 3} C2 = {1, 4, 5} C3 = {6}
2 C1 = {2, 3} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {1, 6}
3 C1 = {2, 3} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {6} C4 = {1}
4 C1 = {1, 3} C2 = {2, 4, 5} C3 = {6}
5 C1 = {1, 3} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {2, 6}
6 C1 = {1, 3} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {6} C4 = {2}
7 C1 = {1, 2} C2 = {3, 4, 5} C3 = {6}
8 C1 = {1, 2} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {3, 6}
9 C1 = {1, 2} C2 = {4, 5} C3 = {6} C4 = {3}
10 C1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} C2 = {5} C3 = {6}
11 C1 = {1, 2, 3} C2 = {5} C3 = {4, 6}
12 C1 = {1, 2, 3} C2 = {5} C3 = {6} C4 = {4}
13 C1 = {1, 2, 3, 5} C2 = {4} C3 = {6}
14 C1 = {1, 2, 3} C2 = {4} C3 = {5, 6}
15 C1 = {1, 2, 3} C2 = {4} C3 = {6} C4 = {5}
16 C1 = {1, 2, 3, 6} C2 = {4, 5}
17 C1 = {1, 2, 3} C2 = {4, 5, 6}
Example 3. Let the solution of the SVBA described by (35).
Following (37), the full set of different solutions for six agents
is given by B6 = 203, whereas the cardinality of ΨN ,NC is
reduced to 17, according to (38). All partitions included in
that set are detailed in Table 1, where the switching agent
for each case with respect toNC is represented in blue color.
Note that the cases of any agent in C1 or C2 switching to a new
singleton C4 are taking into account. Consider for instance
that N optC , i.e., the solution after performing the fine tuning,
is given by Partition 14 in Table 1 as
Copt1 = {1, 2, 3}, Copt2 = {4}, Copt3 = {5, 6}. (40)
Then, note that link {5, 6} should be removed from set Ee.
Consequently, set EopteC and the final network configuration for
the SVBA-FT would be respectively described by
EopteC = ∅, (41a)
(N optC , EoptC \EopteC ) =
({Copt1 , Copt2 , Copt3 }, EoptC ), (41b)
with EoptC = N optC ×N optC .
V. CASE STUDY
The proposed partitioning scheme has been implemented
in the Barcelona DWN, which is managed by Aguas de
Barcelona, S.A. (AGBAR). The Barcelona DWN distributes
the water supplied by the Ter and Llobregat rivers, which are
regulated at their head by dams with an overall capacity of
600 hm3, to the whole Barcelona metropolitan area. Besides
the rivers, some additional underground wells also contribute
to an overall flow of around 7 m3/s, which becomes potable
by using four drinking water treatment plants. Given the
limits in the water flow provided by each source, there exist
different water prices depending on water treatments and
legal extraction canons.
A. COALITIONAL CONTROL MODEL
Control-oriented schemes for DWNs have been widely an-
alyzed in the literature [37], [38]. In particular, the control
approach of the full Barcelona DWN discussed in [13], [14]
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FIGURE 3. Entire model of the Barcelona DWN [13], [14]
is considered in this paper and depicted in Fig. 3. This model
contains a total amount of 63 tanks, 114 actuators – divided
into 75 pumps and 39 valves – and 88 sectors of consume that
represent the external disturbances. A graph that summarizes
the physical connections among the storage tanks and the
junction nodes is provided in Fig. 4.
In the approach proposed in this paper, as commented
before, an initial pre-partitioning into agents is performed due
to the node equations that appear in the system (see Fig. 3),
e.g.,
FIGURE 4. Graph representing the full Barcelona DWN, where the tanks are
denoted by x, the junction nodes by N, and with the arrows representing the
directions of the flows.
.
u(25)− u(27)− u(28)− u(29)− u(105)− d(15) = 0,
u(27)− u(26)− d(36) = 0,
(42)
physically connect flows u(25), u(26), u(27), u(28), u(29)
and u(105). Hence, the values of these flows must be simulta-
neously determined. For this reason, they are assigned to the
same agent. As a consequence, the only coupling among the
subsystems is due to the inputs effect in the dynamical model.
Therefore, in the case study,Aij = 0 in (1), and equivalently,
ACj = 0 in (4). Considering this approach, 43 agents have
been obtained, where the criterion of considering outflows
as disturbances has been assumed, i.e., agents control their
inflows. The explicit definition of each agent is included in
Appendix A, where the identification of Agent 1 is detailed
as an example.
Remark 7. Following this approach, the constraints imposed
by the node equations are assigned to a given agent and are
always satisfied. This fact represents an advantage with re-
spect to the partitioning performed in [13], where the agents
do not satisfy in general the node equations and the resulting
components need to communicate partially following a hi-
erarchical structure and generating virtual demands among
them, i.e., they cannot work in a truly decentralized fashion.
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From an overall centralized viewpoint, the following equa-
tions are satisfied:
xN (k + 1) = ANxN (k) +BNuN (k) +BpNdN (k),
(43a)
0 = ENuN (k) +EdNdN (k), (43b)
with xN (k) ∈ R63, uN (k) ∈ R114 and dN (k) ∈ R88.
This way, (43a) corresponds with the dynamics of the storage
tanks, and (43b) describes the network static relations due to
the mass balance at each of the 17 junction nodes (see Fig. 3),
with EN ∈ R17×114 and EdN ∈ R17×88 being weighting
matrices of proper dimensions.
Finally, consider the main physical constraints of the DWN
given by the variables related to the tank volumes and manip-
ulated flows, i.e., ∀k
xminN ≤ xN (k) ≤ xmaxN ,
uminN ≤ uN (k) ≤ umaxN .
(44)
Remark 8. Soft constraints have been introduced to imple-
ment the state constraints in (44). This fact, combined with
the pre-partitioning based on the node equations, avoid in-
feasibility issues when solving the optimization problems.
Remark 9. In order to assess the impact of the links from a
decision-making viewpoint, it is assumed that each agent has
access to overall state xN (k), and knows how its decisions
affect the overall system. However, decisions can only be
coordinated inside coalitions, i.e., even when the different
coalitions try to optimize the overall system performance,
they cannot agree upon the value of the system variables.
B. CONTROL OBJECTIVE: SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
CRITERIA
The following management policies for the Barcelona DWN
are considered given the knowledge of the system and the
performance objectives to be reached (see [13], [14] for de-
tails):
• Minimizing drinking water production and transport
costs due to chemicals, legal canons and electricity
costs, which are expressed as
f1,i(k) = (We1α1 +We2α2(k))
Tui(k), (45)
where vector α1 ∈ Rnui corresponds to water costs,
vector α2(k) ∈ Rnui considers time-dependent elec-
tricity costs, and matrices We1 ,We2 ∈ Rnui×nui add
the corresponding prioritization to the aforementioned
costs within the related multi-objective optimization
problem.
• Maintaining the stored volume around a given safety
value in case of emergency, which is achieved by mini-
mizing
f2,i(k) = ς
T
i (k)Wxςi(k), (46)
with
xi(k) ≥ xsafi − ςi(k) ≥ 0, (47)
where xsafi ∈ Rnxi is a vector of safety volume thresh-
olds in m3 (conveniently determined according to the
management company policies related to the DWN),
with ςi(k) ∈ Rnxi representing the amount of volume
going down from the desired thresholds, and where
Wx ∈ Rnxi×nxi is a weighting matrix.
• Penalizing sudden variations of the control inputs by
minimizing
f3,i(k) = ∆u
T
i (k)R∆u∆ui(k), (48)
where ∆ui(k) = ui(k) − ui(k − 1), and with R∆u ∈
Rnui×nui also being a weighting matrix.
Hence, the individual cost related to agent i ∈ N that is
considered in this paper is given by
`i(xi(k),ui(k)
)
= f1,i(k) + f2,i(k) + f3,i(k). (49)
Finally, the aggregate cost of a certain communication com-
ponent C is defined by
`C(xC(k),uC(k)
)
=
∑
i∈C
`i(xi(k),ui(k)
)
, (50)
given that no couplings on the cost are considered in
this work.
Remark 10. Considering how (50) is built, (8) results in a
quadratic programming (QP) problem. Therefore, convexity
is guaranteed in the proposed approach, which allows a fast
calculation of the solution for each optimization problem and
a computation of (9) in polynomial time, as required in [28].
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The Shapley-value-based partitioning algorithm presented
in this paper has been tested for the Barcelona DWN by
using the Matlab® solver quadprog in a 3.4 GHz Intel
Octa-Core® i7-6400, 16 GB RAM computer. This way, a
coalitional MPC scheme has been implemented in closed
loop by considering Tsim = 24 simulation instants (one day),
and with Np = 12. The numerical values of the performance
parameters are determined by a trial-and-error procedure,
resulting in We1 = 0.9I, We2 = 0.5I, Wx = 10I,
R∆u = 0.1I, with I being the identity matrix of suitable
dimensions. Note also that there is no reference when consid-
ering (46), i.e., the controller chooses the most appropriate
water volumes that satisfy the soft constraints imposed by
xsafi . Likewise, the initial state is constant for all possible
coalitions and is slightly above the minimum safety level.
The Shapley values for the 43 agents cannot be directly
computed due to computational issues, which are solved here
via the randomized method [28] introduced in Section III-A,
considering ε = 0.2σφi , ∀i ∈ N , λ = 0.1, and Zλ/2 =
1.6449, which, in order to verify (20), requires a sample
Q with q = 68 permutation vectors. According to (3), the
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TABLE 2. Indices ξ˜l(N ,v) for the 20 best/worst performance links
Best performance links (×107) Worst performance links (×107)
ξ˜1,2 = −5.9125 ξ˜2,29 = −4.5847 ξ˜6,40 = 1.7037 ξ˜23,28 = 2.1592
ξ˜1,3 = −4.3096 ξ˜2,32 = −4.9091 ξ˜8,23 = 1.9146 ξ˜23,33 = 2.0847
ξ˜1,38 = −5.0882 ξ˜2,34 = −4.5568 ξ˜8,40 = 1.9212 ξ˜23,39 = 2.0647
ξ˜2,3 = −7.5647 ξ˜2,36 = −4.2433 ξ˜9,40 = 1.7042 ξ˜23,40 = 2.4991
ξ˜2,4 = −4.5844 ξ˜2,37 = −6.8329 ξ˜12,23 = 2.0487 ξ˜28,33 = 1.7513
ξ˜2,5 = −4.8372 ξ˜2,38 = −8, 3433 ξ˜12,28 = 1.7153 ξ˜28,39 = 1.7313
ξ˜2,15 = −4.5837 ξ˜2,42 = −4.7561 ξ˜12,40 = 2.0553 ξ˜28,40 = 2.1658
ξ˜2,16 = −4.5845 ξ˜3,37 = −5.2300 ξ˜20,23 = 2.0760 ξ˜31,40 = 1.7007
ξ˜2,24 = −4.5836 ξ˜3,38 = −6.7404 ξ˜20,28 = 1.7426 ξ˜33,40 = 2.0913
ξ˜2,27 = −4.5896 ξ˜37,38 = −6.0086 ξ˜20,40 = 2.0826 ξ˜39,40 = 2.0713
43 agents are related to 903 possible communication links.
Likewise, the redistribution of the estimated Shapley value of
the agent-based game to the links is obtained by using (11).
Notice that for the estimation of the Shapley value, 43·q coali-
tions have been evaluated by means of (9). The performance
of these coalitions in terms of their cardinality is represented
in Fig. 5, where it can be seen a low correlation between
cardinality and coalition performance. In other words, the
key of the partitioning performance is not related to group
as many agents as possible but to select the clusters of
cooperating agents properly.
The corresponding index ξ˜l(N ,v) for every link l = {i, j}
is represented in a color scale in Fig. 6. Likewise, the values
for the 20 best/worst performance links are explicitly indi-
cated in Table 2.
A. SHAPLEY-VALUE-BASED PARTITIONING
APPROACH (SVBA)
The proposed partitioning approach has been tested with the
following thresholds, which have been determined by a trial-
and-error tuning procedure:
Lc = 1.0× 107, (51a)
γ = 2.5, ν = 2.3, ρ = 100, (51b)
Le = 1.5× 107, (52)
FIGURE 5. Cost of the coalitions needed by the randomized method in terms
of their cardinality. Note that there are coalitions with few agents and proper
performance – closer to the grand coalition – and vice versa, i.e., coalitions
with many agents and performance similar to the empty coalition.
FIGURE 6. Estimated redistributions of the Shapley value. Yellowest and
bluest colors represent most expensive and cheapest links, respectively.
It can be seen that agents 2, 3 and 38 are endpoints of the links with best
performance, whereas agents 23 and 40 are related to the links with the
worst ones.
where several requirements have been considered in the ad-
justment of the aforementioned thresholds. In the first place,
a cardinality constraint for any component of 0.2|N | has
been imposed, for our primary goal is to avoid components
larger than one fifth of the system agents. Secondary goals
were also considered, specifically to increase the cardinality
of the resulting components so as to reduce the number
of singletons.
Notice that Ee is completely delimited by Le. Likewise,
with parameters in (51b) set to zero, set Ec would also
be completely determined by Lc. Under this premise, it is
possible to represent the cardinality of both sets Ec and Ee
as a function of any threshold corresponding to either Lc or
Le, which is depicted in Fig. 7. Notice that both functions are
symmetric given that in the limit case, i.e., Lc = Le = L ,
it is trivially verified
|Ec(L )|+ |Ee(L )| = |E|. (53)
FIGURE 7. Cardinality of sets Ec and Ee as a function of a given thresholdL ,
for the particular case of not considering parameters to balance the size of the
resulting components, i.e., γ = ρ = 0. The red crosses refer to the chosen
thresholds, i.e., |Ec(Lc)| = 699 and |Ee(Le)| = 65.
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As seen in Fig. 7, set Ec for γ = ρ = 0 would be composed
of 699 links. Note that these links connect all agents in N ,
achieving the grand coalition, i.e., NC = {N}. For this
reason, (51b) is considered to penalize not only incoming
links in Ec(s), but also their remaining neighbors in E\Ec(s).
As a result, the following 52 links have been obtained and
drawn in Fig. 8 in a color scale between green and yellow,
with darkest links representing the useful ones:
Ec =
{{2, 38}, {2, 3}, {2, 37}, {3, 38}, {37, 38}, {1, 2}, {3, 37},
{1, 38}, {2, 32}, {2, 5}, {2, 42}, {2, 27}, {1, 3}, {32, 38},
{5, 38}, {38, 42}, {27, 38}, {1, 37}, {3, 32}, {3, 5}, {3, 42},
{3, 27}, {32, 37}, {5, 37}, {37, 42}, {27, 37}, {1, 32}, {1, 5},
{1, 42}, {1, 27}, {5, 32}, {32, 42}, {5, 42}, {16, 29}, {4, 15},
{24, 34}, {27, 32}, {4, 29}, {15, 16}, {4, 16}, {15, 29},
{5, 27}, {27, 42}, {24, 36}, {34, 36}, {21, 43}, {13, 14},
{18, 26}, {17, 30}, {10, 19}, {7, 22}, {11, 25}},
(54)
obtaining therefore the corresponding partitioning approach
described below:
NC =
{ C1︷ ︸︸ ︷{1, 2, 3, 5, 27, 32, 37, 38, 42}, C2︷ ︸︸ ︷{4, 15, 16, 29},
C3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 34, 36},
C4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{7, 22},
C5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 19},
C6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{11, 25},
C7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
C8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{17, 30},
C9︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 26},
C10︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 43},
C11︷︸︸︷
{6} ,
C12︷︸︸︷
{8} ,
C13︷︸︸︷
{9} ,
C14︷︸︸︷
{12},
C15︷︸︸︷
{20},
C16︷︸︸︷
{23},
C17︷︸︸︷
{28},
C18︷︸︸︷
{31},
C19︷︸︸︷
{33},
C20︷︸︸︷
{35},
C21︷︸︸︷
{39},
C22︷︸︸︷
{40},
C23︷︸︸︷
{41}}.
(55)
Likewise, Ee is composed by the following 65 links:
Ee =
{{23, 40}, {28, 40}, {23, 28}, {33, 40}, {23, 33}, {20, 40},
{20, 23}, {39, 40}, {23, 39}, {12, 40}, {12, 23}, {8, 40},
{8, 23}, {28, 33}, {20, 28}, {28, 39}, {12, 28}, {9, 40},
{6, 40}, {31, 40}, {9, 23}, {6, 23}, {40, 41}, {23, 31},
{23, 41}, {35, 40}, {25, 40}, {11, 40}, {22, 40}, {23, 35},
{7, 40}, {10, 40}, {19, 40}, {17, 40}, {30, 40}, {18, 40},
{26, 40}, {20, 33}, {23, 25}, {14, 40}, {11, 23}, {22, 23},
{7, 23}, {10, 23}, {19, 23}, {17, 23}, {23, 30}, {18, 23},
{23, 26}, {13, 40}, {14, 23}, {33, 39}, {13, 23}, {20, 39},
{12, 33}, {12, 20}, {21, 40}, {12, 39}, {21, 23}, {40, 43},
{36, 40}, {23, 43}, {23, 36}, {8, 28}, {8, 33}},
(56)
and the corresponding set EeC is given by
EeC =
{{C14, C15}, {C14, C21}, {C15, C21}, {C16, Ch}h≥4\{16},
{C17, Ch}h={12,14,15,19,21}, {C19, Ch}h={12,14,15,21},
{C22, Ch}h≥4\{22}
}
.
(57)
Finally, the overall network after performing the parti-
tioning by the SVBA would be described by (55) and (57),
achieving the network configuration specified in (33).
B. PARTITIONING APPROACH FINE TUNING (SVBA-FT)
The partitioning approach has been optimized for a simula-
tion of a day with average demand and disturbances, starting
by finding the partition with minimum cumulated cost N (1)C
from set Ψ(0)N ,NC = ΨN ,NC , which in turns is obtained from
TABLE 3. SVBA-FT Optimization Procedure
r Switches with respect to (55) Jcum(N (r)C ) γ(r)
1 Agent 43 from C10 to C17 9.7859 ×107 –
2 Agent 5 from C1 to C2 9.7096 ×107 –
3 Agent 43 from C17 to C1 2.5892 ×107 27.44 %
4 Agent 9 from C13 to C2 2.5098 ×107 25.73 %
5 Agent 11 from C6 to C14 2.4858 ×107 25.78 %
6 Agent 22 from C4 to C10 2.4619 ×107 1.66 %
7 Agent 17 from C8 to C5 2.4429 ×107 0.90 %
solution NC described by (55). This optimization procedure
has been recursively applied considering size constraints
similar to those of the SVBA, i.e.,
|Cs| ≤ d0.2|N |e = d8.6e = 9, ∀Cs ∈ N (r)C , s = 1, . . . , nc,
(58)
and the following stopping criterion:
γ(r) < 1%, (59)
with
γ(r) =
1
3
2∑
j=0
(
Jcum(N (r−3+j)C )− Jcum(N (r−2+j)C )
Jcum(N (r−3+j)C )
)
,
(60)
where a 3-step average performance improvement has been
considered, taking Jcum(N (0)C ) = Jcum(NC) = 1.0662×108,
r ∈ N+, r > 3.
The results related to every iteration are detailed in Table 3,
where only rstop = 7 steps have been needed to fulfill the
stopping criterion described by (59), which indicates that the
solution in (55) is indeed a suitable starting point. Note that
FIGURE 8. Links belonging to Ec after applying the partitioning procedure,
with their performance normalized. This way, value “0” refers to the link with
best performance, i.e., {2, 38}, and it is drawn in pure green, and value “1”
is related to the link with worst performance out of the 52 links in Ec,
i.e., {11, 25}, and it is represented in pure yellow.
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the number of partitions explored by the greedy procedure
can be easily calculated by
∑rstop−1
r=0 |Ψ(r)N ,NC | = 6143. The
definitive solution after applying the optimization procedure
is determined by
N optC =
{ Copt1︷ ︸︸ ︷{1, 2, 3, 27, 32, 37, 38, 42, 43}, C
opt
2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 29},
Copt3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 17, 19},
Copt4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 34, 36},
Copt5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{11, 12},
Copt6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
Copt7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 26},
Copt8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 22},
Copt9︷︸︸︷
{6} ,
Copt10︷︸︸︷
{7} ,
Copt11︷︸︸︷
{8} ,
Copt12︷︸︸︷
{20},
Copt13︷︸︸︷
{23},
Copt14︷︸︸︷
{25},
Copt15︷︸︸︷
{28},
Copt16︷︸︸︷
{30},
Copt17︷︸︸︷
{31},
Copt18︷︸︸︷
{33},
Copt19︷︸︸︷
{35},
Copt20︷︸︸︷
{39},
Copt21︷︸︸︷
{40},
Copt22︷︸︸︷
{41}}.
(61)
Finally, note that the switches performed as a result of the
optimization procedure do not imply to remove any commu-
nication link in set Ee. Consequently, set EeC remains constant
with respect to (57), being the final network configuration
described by
(N optC , EoptC \EeC ), (62)
with EoptC = N optC ×N optC . In any case, note that cheaper/more
expensive agents illustrated in Fig. 6 are not affected by the
changes introduced by the fine tuning.
Remark 11. Given that the proposed procedure optimizes
discrete variables, i.e., the components, γ(r) might increase
in further iterations with r. That is, there is no guarantee
that the imposed limit becomes a bound for later iterations.
Nevertheless, the average way in which γ(r) is defined miti-
gates this possibility.
C. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED PARTITIONING
SOLUTIONS WITH OTHER SCHEMES IN THE
LITERATURE
In this section, both the original and refined proposed
partitioning solutions will be compared with the solu-
tions obtained by applying other different partitioning ap-
proaches [10], [13] to the full Barcelona DWN, and also with
the centralized and decentralized configurations.
1) An alternative Barcelona DWN partitioning scheme
In [13], an alternative partitioning method of the same
Barcelona DWN model analyzed in this paper, which basi-
cally consists in a graph-theory-based approach (GTBA), is
proposed. Nevertheless, that work follows a different crite-
rion to define the agents, and for this reason their results
are not directly comparable with the approach proposed here.
With the aim of providing a way to compare all approaches,
it has been considered that each of the 43 agents defined
here belong to a component described in [13] if all its related
variables, i.e., states, inputs, disturbances, are contained into
this component. Under this assumption, which represents an
approximation of the partitioning in [13], most of the 43
agents have been distributed into the six components in [13],
with the exception of agents 1 and 2, which have been
assumed to belong to new independent components. Taking
this fact into account, the partitioning provided by the GTBA
can be modeled by
N GTBAC =
{ CGTBA1︷ ︸︸ ︷{24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, 42, 43},
CGTBA2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20},
CGTBA3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{29, 30, 31, 32},
CGTBA4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{33, 34, 35, 36},
CGTBA5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{21, 22, 23},
CGTBA6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 39, 40, 41},
CGTBA7︷︸︸︷
{1} ,
CGTBA8︷︸︸︷
{2} },
(63)
where it can be seen that this solution does not respect
the size constraints imposed to the SVBA/SVBA-FT, which
represents an advantage for the GTBA.
2) A partitioning approach applied to other DWN
In [10], a partitioning approach based on social network
algorithms (SNBA) is introduced and applied to the Parete
DWN, located in the South of Caserta, Italy. Basically, this
approach uses the centrality index called edge betweenness
as a metric to identify the boundaries of communities [39].
Let (V,L) be a directed graph that describes the direction of
the flows, symbolized by links lf ∈ L, among any pair of
vertices {s, t} ∈ V , which are related to water entities, e.g.,
tanks. The edge betweenness cB(lf) of a link lf is defined as
the number of optimal paths between vertex pairs that run
along link lf, summed over all vertex pairs, as follows [40]:
cB(lf) =
∑
{s,t}∈V
σ(s, t|lf)
σ(s, t)
, (64)
where σ(s, t) is the number of shortest (s, t)-paths, and
σ(s, t|lf) is the number of those paths passing through link lf.
This way, an optimal community cluster can be defined
by progressively removing edges with high value of edge
betweenness from the original graph [39]. In other words,
index (64) identifies edges in a network that lie between
communities, which can be progressively removed leaving
behind just the communities themselves.
Note that for the Barcelona DWN case study, the direction
of the flows among the water tanks and junction nodes is
described by graph in Fig. 4. Given that in this work a pre-
partitioning into agents has been made, to properly apply the
scheme proposed in [10] it is needed to map the previous
graph into a new one that depicts the direction of the flows
among the agents. As a result, graph (V,L) represented in
Fig. 9, with V = N = 43 agents and L = 49 directed links
has been obtained, where each agent comprises information
regarding several tanks and nodes following the criterion
established in Section V-A. Once graph (V,L) is established,
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FIGURE 9. Graph (V,L) representing the direction of the flows among the
43 agents for the full Barcelona DWN. As it can be seen, agent 2 has a strong
centrality regarding the flows.
it is possible to compute index (64) for all these 49 directed
links. Finally, in order to obtain the partitioning solution, the
links with higher edge betweenness have been progressively
removed until achieve the stopping criterion of a maximum
cardinality for any component of 0.2|N |, as done in the
partitioning approach proposed in this paper. As a result,
18 links have been removed, which are depicted by green
dashed arrows in Fig. 9, and explicitly represented joint to
their cB(lf) in Table 4. The resulting partitioning scheme is
given below:
N SNBAC =
{ CSNBA1︷ ︸︸ ︷{2, 6, 7, 8, 29, 31, 33, 36, 41},
CSNBA2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{1, 3, 21, 22, 23, 25, 37, 38},
CSNBA3︷ ︸︸ ︷
{15, 16, 19},
CSNBA4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{4, 5},
CSNBA5︷ ︸︸ ︷
{10, 11},
CSNBA6︷ ︸︸ ︷
{13, 14},
CSNBA7︷ ︸︸ ︷
{18, 20},
CSNBA8︷ ︸︸ ︷
{24, 26},
CSNBA9︷ ︸︸ ︷
{27, 42},
CSNBA10︷ ︸︸ ︷
{28, 43},
CSNBA11︷ ︸︸ ︷
{30, 32},
CSNBA12︷ ︸︸ ︷
{34, 35},
CSNBA13︷ ︸︸ ︷
{39, 40},
CSNBA14︷︸︸︷
{9} ,
CSNBA15︷︸︸︷
{12},
CSNBA16︷︸︸︷
{17}}.
(65)
Remark 12. Directed graph (V,L) = (N ,L) has nothing to
do with complete undirected graph (N , E), which was used
in the partitioning algorithm proposed in Section IV. The
former represents the direction of the physical flows among
the agents, i.e., |L| = 49, whereas the latter assumes that
all agents are initially interconnected, i.e., |E| = 903, to
later classify these undirected communication links into sets
Ec and Ee regarding their control performance.
TABLE 4. Edge betweenness cB(lf) of directed links lf removed from graph in
Fig. 9 to find communities
cB(lf) lf cB(lf) lf cB(lf) lf
56 {2, 20} 35 {43, 2} 18 {17, 14}
37 {1, 2} 28 {2, 42} 16 {9, 5}
36 {3, 2} 24 {20, 17} 16 {12, 11}
35 {37, 2} 24 {20, 19} 16 {42, 26}
35 {38, 2} 21 {2, 9} 14 {2, 32}
35 {39, 2} 21 {2, 12} 14 {2, 35}
TABLE 5. Sensitivity Analysis of the Different Schemes
Indices CEN SVBA-FT SVBA
Jcum(NC) 2.1405 ×106 2.4429 ×107 1.0662 ×108
|ΨN ,NC | 43 841 898
Jmaxcum (ΨN ,NC ) 2.8109 ×108 2.6106 ×108 2.7493 ×108
Jµcum(ΨN ,NC ) 1.3750 ×107 3.6118 ×107 1.1541 ×108
Jmincum (ΨN ,NC ) 2.1405 ×106 2.4355 ×107 9.7859 ×107
η0.1% 100.00 % 98.22 % 97.10 %
Indices SNBA [10] GTBA [13] DEC
Jcum(NC) 2.9002 ×108 1.1120 ×1010 1.1925 ×1010
|ΨN ,NC | 682 341 903
Jmaxcum (ΨN ,NC ) 8.7937 ×109 1.1263 ×1010 1.2231 ×1010
Jµcum(ΨN ,NC ) 6.3178 ×108 1.0855 ×1010 1.1884 ×1010
Jmincum (ΨN ,NC ) 1.0748 ×108 2.8767 ×108 2.9576 ×108
η0.1% 89.88 % 86.22 % 97.79 %
Sensitivity analysis comparison
All approaches have been tested by using the sensitivity
analysis introduced in Section IV-A, where the solutions,
defined respectively by (55), (61), (63), (65), and also the
centralized (CEN) and decentralized (DEC) configurations,
have been compared with those in their corresponding sets
ΨN ,NC . The cardinality of these sets (obtained by (38)) and
the related indices are illustrated in Table 5 for the same av-
erage day used in the previous section, where an uncertainty
limit of p = 0.1% has been assumed in the computation
of ηp. As expected, the value Jmincum (ΨN ,NC ) of the SVBA
corresponds with the first step of the optimization procedure
in Table 3.
Note that |ΨN ,NC | provides the number of partitioning
solutions explored in the sensitivity analysis. Nevertheless,
only the solutions of that set that satisfy the size constraints,
i.e., maximum cardinality for any component of 0.2|N |,
should be considered. This way, note that the CEN has been
included in this comparison even without any element in
the corresponding set ΨN ,NC trivially satisfying this size
constraint, which explains its best performance. Likewise, as
commented before, there are two components of the GTBA
that also do not respect the size constraints, which represent
an advantage to this scheme in the comparisons.
As can be seen, the values of Jcum(NC), Jmincum (ΨN ,NC ) and
Jmaxcum (ΨN ,NC ) for the SVBA/SVBA-FT improve those of
the GTBA, SNBA and DEC. That is, the proposed solutions
improve the performance of the rest. According to ηp, it can
be checked that the SVBA outperforms a higher portion of
partitioning solutions in corresponding sets ΨN ,NC than the
GTBA and SNBA, and is in the order of the DEC, which
in any case is improved by the SVBA-FT. This finding is
consistent with Fig. 5, which already illustrated that only a
few topological changes in the network can increase the per-
formance substantially. Note as well that the SVBA/SVBA-
FT also outperform the other methods when the difference
between the cost of the different approaches and the cor-
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TABLE 6. Overview of the different methods considered
Scheme |NC | Jcum(NC)-30 days
CEN 1 3.7569 ×106
SVBA-FT 22 1.7422 ×108
SVBA 23 7.7357 ×108
SNBA [10] 16 1.3220 ×1011
GTBA [13] 8 1.1357 ×1012
DEC 43 2.3669 ×1012
responding minimum in their set of alternatives ΨN ,NC is
examined, i.e., the proposed approaches are closer to these
minimum-cost solutions than the other methods. Likewise,
it is interesting to check that both the SVBA and SVBA-FT
have a better performance than the mean performance of that
set, i.e., Jcum(NC) < Jµcum(ΨN ,NC ), which is also the case of
the SNBA but does not occur in the GTBA and DEC. Finally,
notice that all parameters in the optimized scheme SVBA-FT
improve those in the SVBA, as expected. All in all, these
results indicate that both proposed approaches outperform
the rest of schemes.
D. PARTITIONING LONG-SIMULATION OVERVIEW
A comparison between the different schemes considered in
this paper is summarized in Table 6, where the cumulated
cost of a 30-day simulation scenario with demand and dis-
turbances taken from real data has been calculated for each
approach. Note that it is reasonable to test the results in
a longer scenario than the one used for the design, i.e.,
one day. It can be seen that both the SVBA and SVBA-FT
improve the results of the GTBA, SNBA and DEC, showing
the effectiveness of the partitioning algorithm proposed in
this paper.
Notice that the SVBA provides us with a suboptimal
solution within the set of B43 options (recall (37)), which
represents a suitable starting point for the fine tuning. Then,
the goal of the SVBA-FT is to increase the performance by
carrying out a greedy search around SVBA. In particular,
significant gains can be obtained by reducing any violation of
constraints, which are severely penalized by soft constraints.
Also, the fine tuning helps to mitigate possible deviations
introduced by the randomized method used for the estimation
of the Shapley value. In any case, note that the fact that of
some links originally included in sets Ec /Ee could be removed
due to the SVBA-FT does not break any physical constraints
of the original DWN given that these constraints are used
to define the agents. This is not the case of other schemes
such us [10], where a fine tuning procedure could break some
physical/topological connections.
Finally, these partitioning results can be improved once the
communication components start exchanging information,
e.g., by using a coalitional control scheme [22], [24].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a heuristic partitioning algorithm for LSS has
been introduced considering that agents are able to operate
in a decentralized fashion. This method ranks the commu-
nication links inside a network from a control-performance
perspective. A game over agents based on the utilization of
coalitional MPC to control the plant has been considered,
and a randomized method has been used to estimate their
Shapley value to deal with combinatorial explosion issues.
The redistribution of the estimated Shapley value of the
agents among the links has been proposed as a measure of
their relevance in the control system and to fix/remove them.
The proposed algorithm calculates sets Ec and Ee. The links
in the former set will determine the communication compo-
nents, where several mechanisms to avoid the formation of
large clusters of cooperating agents have been considered.
Once the components are established, some connections
among them are disconnected by using the information in
the latter set, providing a proper configuration of the overall
network. The resulting partitioning has also been refined by
a method that optimizes it recursively, based on some cost
indices and size constraints. Both the original and refined
approaches have been tested with the Barcelona DWN as a
case study, providing reasonable solutions that outperform
other partitioning schemes available in the literature.
.
APPENDIX A STATES, INPUTS AND DISTURBANCES
RELATED TO THE AGENTS
As mentioned in Section V-A, the flows belonging to the
following node equations:
u(25)− u(27)− u(28)− u(29)− u(105)− d(15) = 0,
u(27)− u(26)− d(36) = 0,
(66)
are physically interconnected, in particular by means of flow
u(27). Then, all states that comprise incoming flows involved
in (66), which are represented in blue color, should belong to
the same agent, i.e.,
x+(22) = x(22) + u(22) + u(26)− u(23)− d(23),
x+(27) = x(27) + u(28)+ u(29)− u(30)− d(28),
x+(57) = x(57) + u(80) + u(89) + u(105)− u(78),
(67)
where superindex + refers to the successors state. Finally,
note that outflows in the states – drawn in red color – are
considered here as disturbances.
By considering this approach, the following 43 Agents
have been obtained:
• Agent 1:
– States: x(22), x(27), x(57).
– Inputs: u(22), u(25), u(26), u(27), u(28), u(29), u(80),
u(89), u(105).
– Disturbances: d(15), d(23), d(28), d(36), u(23), u(30),
u(78).
VOLUME 4, 2016 15
F. J. Muros et al.: A Game Theoretical Randomized Method for Large-Scale Systems Partitioning
• Agent 2:
– States: x(7), x(8), x(9), x(10), x(32), x(35), x(38), x(42),
x(43), x(44), x(45), x(46), x(48), x(49), x(50), x(53),
x(55), x(56), x(60).
– Inputs: u(7), u(8), u(9), u(10), u(33), u(36), u(40), u(41),
u(44), u(45), u(46), u(47), u(48), u(49), u(50), u(51),
u(52), u(53), u(54), u(55), u(56), u(57), u(58), u(59),
u(61), u(62), u(63), u(64), u(66), u(67), u(70), u(71),
u(72), u(74), u(75), u(76), u(77), u(78), u(79), u(81),
u(82), u(83), u(84), u(85), u(86), u(87), u(90), u(91),
u(92), u(93), u(95), u(96), u(97), u(106), u(107), u(110),
u(111), u(113), u(114).
– Disturbances: d(7), d(8), d(9), d(10), d(32), d(40), d(42),
d(43), d(45), d(47), d(50), d(52), d(53), d(54), d(55),
d(57), d(58), d(59), d(60), d(62), d(63), d(64), d(65),
d(69), d(70), d(71), d(72), d(73), d(74), d(75), d(76),
d(77), d(79), d(80), d(81), d(82), d(83), d(84), u(3), u(4),
u(5), u(6), u(13), u(21), u(38), u(42), u(43), u(60), u(67),
u(68), u(69), u(72), u(74), u(94), u(95), u(98), u(101),
u(106), u(107), u(108), u(109), u(111), u(112).
• Agent 3:
– States: x(59).
– Inputs: u(102), u(103), u(104).
– Disturbances: u(88), u(89), u(97).
• Agent 4:
– States: x(1).
– Inputs: u(1).
– Disturbances: d(1).
• Agent 5:
– States: x(2).
– Inputs: u(2).
– Disturbances: d(2), u(1).
• Agent 6:
– States: x(3).
– Inputs: u(3).
– Disturbances: d(3).
• Agent 7:
– States: x(4).
– Inputs: u(4).
– Disturbances: d(4).
• Agent 8:
– States: x(5).
– Inputs: u(5).
– Disturbances: d(5).
• Agent 9:
– States: x(6).
– Inputs: u(6).
– Disturbances: d(6), u(2).
• Agent 10:
– States: x(11).
– Inputs: u(11).
– Disturbances: d(11).
• Agent 11:
– States: x(12).
– Inputs: u(12).
– Disturbances: d(12), u(11).
• Agent 12:
– States: x(13).
– Inputs: u(13).
– Disturbances: d(13), u(12).
• Agent 13:
– States: x(14).
– Inputs: u(14).
– Disturbances: d(14).
• Agent 14:
– States: x(15).
– Inputs: u(15).
– Disturbances: d(16), u(14).
• Agent 15:
– States: x(16).
– Inputs: u(16).
– Disturbances: d(17).
• Agent 16:
– States: x(17).
– Inputs: u(17).
– Disturbances: d(18).
• Agent 17:
– States: x(18).
– Inputs: u(18).
– Disturbances: d(19), u(15).
• Agent 18:
– States: x(19).
– Inputs: u(19).
– Disturbances: d(20).
• Agent 19:
– States: x(20).
– Inputs: u(20).
– Disturbances: d(21), u(16), u(17).
• Agent 20:
– States: x(21).
– Inputs: u(21).
– Disturbances: d(22), u(18), u(19), u(20).
• Agent 21:
– States: x(23).
– Inputs: u(23).
– Disturbances: d(24), u(24).
• Agent 22:
– States: x(24).
– Inputs: u(24).
– Disturbances: d(25), d(38).
• Agent 23:
– States: x(25).
– Inputs: u(30).
– Disturbances: d(26).
• Agent 24:
– States: x(26).
– Inputs: u(31).
– Disturbances: d(27), d(35).
• Agent 25:
– States: x(30).
– Inputs: u(32).
– Disturbances: d(34).
• Agent 26:
– States: x(28).
– Inputs: u(34).
– Disturbances: d(29), u(31).
• Agent 27:
– States: x(29).
– Inputs: u(35).
– Disturbances: d(30), d(37).
• Agent 28:
– States: x(36).
– Inputs: u(37).
– Disturbances: d(41).
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• Agent 29:
– States: x(34).
– Inputs: u(38).
– Disturbances: d(39).
• Agent 30:
– States: x(40).
– Inputs: u(39).
– Disturbances: d(51).
• Agent 31:
– States: x(39).
– Inputs: u(42).
– Disturbances: d(48), d(49).
• Agent 32:
– States: x(41).
– Inputs: u(43).
– Disturbances: d(56), u(39).
• Agent 33:
– States: x(47).
– Inputs: u(60).
– Disturbances: d(61).
• Agent 34:
– States: x(51).
– Inputs: u(65).
– Disturbances: d(66).
• Agent 35:
– States: x(52).
– Inputs: u(68).
– Disturbances: d(67), u(65).
• Agent 36:
– States: x(54).
– Inputs: u(69).
– Disturbances: d(68).
• Agent 37:
– States: x(33).
– Inputs: u(73), u(108).
– Disturbances: d(33), u(32), u(33).
• Agent 38:
– States: x(58).
– Inputs: u(88).
– Disturbances: d(78), u(73), u(80), u(82), u(87).
• Agent 39:
– States: x(61).
– Inputs: u(94), u(98), u(99).
– Disturbances: d(85), u(93), u(100).
• Agent 40:
– States: x(62).
– Inputs: u(100).
– Disturbances: d(87), d(88).
• Agent 41:
– States: x(63).
– Inputs: u(101).
– Disturbances: d(86).
• Agent 42:
– States: x(31).
– Inputs: u(109).
– Disturbances: d(31), u(34), u(35).
• Agent 43:
– States: x(37).
– Inputs: u(112).
– Disturbances: d(44), d(46), u(37), u(114).
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